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Social Science
BUSINESS AFTER THE WAR
ARTHUR

R.

UPGRI~N

Federal Reserve Bank of k[inneapolis

There can be little question but that the most striking development of the wartime period is the steady and rapid rise in the national income of the people of the United States. From a level
slightly in excess of 70 billion dollars in 1939 the national income
increased to 76 billion dollars in 1940, to 95 billion dollars in 1941,
and to more than 119 billion dollars in 1942. Further increases can
be confidently expected, and in fact, Secretary Jones of the Department of Commerce recently estimated the national income for 1!)43
at 135 billion dollars. This is one of the central facts in the wartime
change_s in our economy. Our government has work for everyone
able to contribute in the war program. It will find the means to pay
for its expenditures. Its payments make incomes high.
Through the year 1941 consumers were reasonably free to spend
their new higher incomes in the purchase of consumer goods. Since
1941, however, although incomes have been rising, ,expenditures of
consumers for many kinds of goods have been falling. It now appears that in the present year, 1943, because of widespread shortages of goods, consumers' expenditures in almost all important lines
will be greatly decreased. This situation is reflected and has its
complement in the growth of total savings of the people of the
United States. These increased in 1942 to a level of no less than
26 billion dollars from 12 billion dollars in 1941, and from only 7
billion dollars in 1!)40. It is, of course, to be hoped that a majority
of consumers' savings will be invested in government securities in
order that inflation may be checked.
As a result of these changes, private residential housing is almost
non-existent except for defense workers. Expenditures of consumers
for all kinds of durable goods-automobiles, electric refrigerators,
household appliances, in fact, of anything made of the new precious
metals-will have been reduced by probably three-fourths from the
annual level before Pearl Harbor. lVIany other kinds of expenditures
of both consumers and businesses as well are being drastically reduced. In fact, civilian industries may not even be able to spend
their depreciation allowance for plant and equipment to make good
the Wear and tear of wartime years. The importance of even just
these replacement expenditures is indicated in the fact that American industries' annual total depreciation charges are more than 5
billion dollars.
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF VVAHTIME CHANGES FOR BUSINESS
There exists an increasingly wide realization that an immense
amount of deferred demand will have been accumulated during the
years of the war. In a recent article (Harvard Business Review,.
Autumn, 1942) Professor Sumner H. Slichter estimated the amounts
of deferred dema1id that would be accumulated_by June 30, 1944.
These are .give1rin Table I.
·
TABLE I.

ESTIMATED DEFEUHED DEMANDS FOH Gooos THAT vVrLL BE
ACCUMULATED IN THE UNITED STATES BY JUNE 30, 1944
Deferred demand for housing .......................... $ 3.7 billion
Deferred demand for consumers' durable goods...........
Private business construction and equipment deferred
demand . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deferred priYale maintenance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deferred demand for consumers' semi-durable goods......
Deferred public works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Deferred public maintenance ..................... ·.....

8.7 billion
5.2
2.0
3.0
2.7
0.G

billion
billion ·
billion
billion
billion

Total Estimated Deferred Demand at
June 30, 1944 ........................... $25.!J billion

Not only will these huge amounts of needs be accumulated during the war, but the public simultaneously is accumulating buying
power that, in light of the "potential" but never realized deferred
demand of the 1930's can make this huge wartime forced deferred
demand into effective 111arket dcman.cl when the ·war is .ended. In a
recent speech (New York Times, January 15, i943) David C.
Prince, Vice President of General Electric Company, cited figures
indicating that a backlog of buying power of 32 billion dollars would
be accumulated by consumers by the end of 1943. In the depression
years of the 1930's, in contrast, consumer debts were high a11d con~
··sumers' savings low, accompanied by huge losses in consumers'
capital resources. In the present wartime period, however, consumers are sharply increasing their savings, their investments, their
bank deposits, and substantially reducing their debts.
Reliance for a,high level for business after the war by no means
is to be placed wholly upon accumulations of deferred demand even
though they may be fully backed by increased savings and prepared for by debt retirement. An even more significant factor is
that the national income will be high throughout the years of the
war. If reasonably high level incomes can be maintained after the
war, the buying power such current incomes can generate will prove
to be the greatest source of support for business. In addition, the
combination of a high level national income. and accumulated
financial resources gives excellent promise that business activity
itself will be enough lo offer strong assurance of maintaining the

,
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high level for the national i11come that was at first assumed merely
to find out what its results can be and as they are next reviewed.
THE NATURE OF CONSUMER "WANTS BASED ON A HIGH
NATIONAL INCOME

In 1941 when the national income was about 95 billion dollars,
total purchases of consumers' and producers' goods for private account were at their maximum in recent years. Since 1941, as has
been indicated above, the national income has further increased
substantially to a level of about 115 billion dollars. We have reasonably adequate figures as to the quantities of goods the American
people purchased in 1941 with the incomes they then enjoyed.
Can "'e obtain an idea of what they would buy if they were free to
dispose of a higher income than they have ever had to spend in the
past?
In Table ~ a comparison is made of the amounts of various
classes of goods that were actually purchased in 1941 with the
TABLE II.
ESTilVIATED ANNUAL CONSUMER EXPENDITURES IN 1941 AND
PnoJECTED PosTWAH EXPENDITURES AssUMED A NATIONAL
lNcoME OF ABOUT $115,000,000,000

Estimated
Consumer
Expenditures
in 1941

Projected Postwar
Expenditures ol'
Consumers (Based
on a National
Income of about
$11.5,000,000,000)

(In millions of dollars)

Consumers' Expendilmes for:
lVIanufaclured foods and like products ...... .
All other nondurable commodities ...... .'... .

$17.500
]Ci,500

$

Tolnl nondurable goods ................ .

$34.000

$ 40.000

H,,rno

$ 10,000

Clothing and accessories, including shoes ... .
All other semi-durable commodities ........ .
Total expenditures l'or all services (heallh,
education, recreation, etc.) ............. .
Consumers' durable commodities .......... .
Residential construction .................. .
Total consumers' outlays .............. .

$

2\i,ooo
18,000

3,000

,i:ooo

20,000
10,500
3,500

30,000
14,500
Ci,000

$79,500

$104,000

amounts that wou)d be purchased if a larger income of 115 billion
dollars could be freely spent for consumers' goods. A simple way
of stating how such expenditures would be made as to various
classes of goods, in view of the fact the American people have not
been free to purchase with such higher incomes, is the assumption
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that the American people do follow the practice of "keeping up with
the Joneses." By this is meant that with a higher national income
a larger number of people enjoy incomes, for example, ranging from
$2,000 to $2,500 and a smaller number enjoy incomes from $1,500
to $2,000. The directions in which the larger number of people
would spend their higher incomes is based upon the belief that as
the one group moves into the higher income class of the other group
their outlays for goods and services take the budget pattern of the
latter group. Since budgets are known in advance by inquiry into
the expenditures of all inco'me groups we can determine the new
totals for consumers' expenditures based upon their higher level
incomes. In Table 2 it is the increased expenditures that are indicated in comparison with the outlays of consumers in 1941.
The foregoing total figures are not to be reconciled directly with
the national income for the reason that the amounts given above
are not given on a basis comparable with figures for the national
income. This is owing to the fact that the net national income is
always calculated after deduction for various items; i.e., it is a net
figure, including particularly, for example, that part of output
which is required to make good depreciation of durable goods. The
economy produces some goods for consumers' replacements and
they are a part of total production, of total consumers' takings, but
they are not a part of the net national income ..
Consumer expenditures, as listed above by classes for 1941,
therefore embrace quantities taken both for replacement and for.
ordinary consumption. However, since the same basis has been used
in the esti_mates for consumer demands in the postwar year, the
comparison is appropriate to show amounts and directions of th~
increases in outlays corisumers would make when they again will
be free to dispose of their incomes in accordance with their free
choices. The higher level of national income would result in a total
enlargement of consumer takings of 25 billion dollars.
These estimates are given not as forecasts but as a way of approach to the problem of the markets business may. expect after
the war, and as a way of inquiring into the problems of financing·
business that will come to the fore wqen war production is to cease.
Business itself, on its own superior knowledge, will make its final
estimations b;y: individual companies and individual products. When
this is clone more reliable figures will be available for the financial
advance budgeting that is needed. It is this kind of pla,nning that is
needed and that will be approved by everyone.
0

THE OUTLOOK FOR THE NATiONAL INCOME AFTER' THE WAR

The question, of course, that is in the mind of every credit man
and retailer is what is the outlook for business activity and national
income after the war. Will the tremendous debt that the nation has
built up eat into the postwar prosperity, and will business custo-
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mers have adequate incomes to assure a large market and be good
credit risks?
The question of how well our government can manage its debt
after the war can most simply be put in terms of a single question:
Can we maintain a high national incom.e after the war?
If the answer to this question is "Yes" there certainly is no rea-·
son why our government cannot take care of interest and even
achieve some retirement of the debt that will be outstanding when
the war ends.
In the first place, there is certainly one kernel of truth in the
statement that a national debt differs from a corporate or individual debt. The difference is that whatever we tax our people to pay
interest on debt, that interest is paid to our people and becomes
income to all who receive it.
Consequently, if the income of our people can be maintained at
a high level there should be no unsolvable problem in seeing to it
that the government takes in enough money to pay interest on the
debt. The problem is one of collecting taxes from us all and dispei·sing interest to us all. Unlike a debt owed abroad, we as a nation
do not lose anything when we collect taxes to pay interest that is
returned at once to our people. But, if the income of our people
declines substantially, the taxes will not yield enough and it will be
difficult to increase them.
Tim

NATIONAL INc01vrn IN

Hl4:1

For 1943 Secretary Jones of the Department of Commerce has
estimated the total national income at $135 billion. Last year the
figure was slightly above $115 billion. Somewhere betiveen these
two figures, perhaps we may accept a fig·ure of $120 billion, lies that
income which would represent reasonably full activity and reasonably full employment. No doubt we shall produce more than that
during the war ·but boys will be employed in producing it, who,
after the war, should return to schools, men above sixty-five will
be employed who will naturally wish to retire, many women will
be employed who will not wish employment after the war, and we
shall probably return to a shorter work week.
FACTORS FAVORABLE TO THE :fyIAINTENANCE OF A
NATIONAL INCOME ~FTER THE WAR

I-Irnu

LEVEL

It has been estimated that by the end of the present year the
American people will have accumulated no less than $32 billion of
wartime savings or financial reserves which they will want to use
for the purchase of civilian goods when they are again available.
It has also been estimated that by about the end of the present
year no less than $26 billion of deferred demands will have accumulated-representing goods our people have been quite prepared to
pay for but which have not been available to them. It is interest-
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ing indeed that current financial accumulations and debt repayment have proceeded at such a rapid rate as to keep the abi)ity of
our people to buy so very high.
It is a curious fact that when the end of the war comes, even
though there might be subs"tantial postarmistice unemployment,
there is every prospect that ability to buy currently will heavily
outrun the immediate ability of industry to produce the goods that
will be wanted. Thus on balance, the economy would be stimulated
and there is far wider agreement that some of the wartime controls
-;-such as price and inventory controls-must be temporarily continued to prevent an undue postwar boom.
:Moreover, governments do not at once end wartime expenditures
with the cessation of hostilities. Rather wartime expenditures tend
to continue for a period of time, thus sustaining the national income levels while civilian industries are taking hold again and,
through their payrolls and payments for raw materials, are building up the share of the income that is secured by ci:vilian production.
·
After the war, as has been pointed out, taxes can be substan~
. tially reduced. That, too, is most stimulating. It is highly significant
that there is wide agreement among all shades of opinion that the
first correction in our tax structure should come in corporate taxes.
Reductions in corporate tax rates can be very stimulating to business.
Another very favorable factor is that technological improvement
during the war is extremely great because the cost of all of it is
charged off as a war expense. These technological i:mprovements
may be expected to burst forth on the economy after the war, and
there .will then have been a heavy accumulation of them. These
technological improvements lead to new industries which require
their own investment which thereby contributes to total activity.
On the side of debts, there has been and is continuing heavy debt
retirement by our people. The Department of Commerce has estimated that consumer instalment debts-to name but one important class-will have been reduced from almost 11 billion dollars at
the time of Pearl Harbor to less than four billion dollars by the
encl of the present year.
Thus, those consumers who do not accumulate financial reserves
during the war will have a debt-free position to again buy on the
instalment plan. That plan of finance after this war will be a tried
and tested institution rather than in emqryo as was the case after
the last war.
These are some of the factors that specifically are the basis for a
prospect for a high, not a low, national income after the war. To
be sure, they depend fundamentally upon one crucial factor. That
is, that we shall succeed in holding prices at a reasonable level
throughout the war period. If that is done, the outlook will indeed
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be most favorable after the war, because the favorable forces need
not spend themselves in price skyrocketing as they did last_ time,
but rather can exert their most powerful influence to an outburst in
production that should permit the United States to achieve levels
heretofore unknown, and levels that" will keep the tax base high,
therefore, the tax yield high-all to maintain unimpaired the highest
integrity any, debt ever had-'-the debt of our government.

THE FUTURE OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE
HERBER'r HEATON

University of J1innesota

This subject is not of my own choosing. I was drafted, and· must
make three conscientious objections to the assignment. In the first
place I am not a prophet. In the· second, I do not regard any political institution, distribution of power, or economic system as
final, but history gives no clue to indicate what the next phase in
the development of an empire or of a social order is likely to be.
And in the third place, I cannot do either justice or mercy to· a
quarter of the land surface of the world and to a quarter of its·
population in thirty minutes.
Let me begin by considering what is this Empire with whose
future we are concerned. Some Britons would suggest it has 110
future because it is already a thing of the past, and ·has given place
to, or been transformed into, the British. Commonwealth of Nations. If empire means the exercise by one nation of politicar control over other peoples of diverse origin and culture, the new name
is more accurate than the old. ,vorld War I lifted the already internally self-governing dominions-Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
and South Africa_:_to the rank of nations. The contributions they
made to that war were a substantial fraction of the British Empire's total effort. They were'larger still when measured in terms of
the dominions' assets in human or physical resources; New Zealand·
lost one in every 66 of her whole population, Australia one in every
93, while our figure was one in every 2,000. They overshadowed the
contrioutions made by many small nations; Canada for example,
lost more men than Portugal put into the field. Thus at a great
price the overseas dominions gained the right to be grown-up partners,· associates, members of a British Commonwealth of Nations,
and this title was hatched while the war was on. In addition they
won recognition as nations in the world when they secured direct
representation at the peace conference, signed the Treaty of Versailles, became foundation members of the League of Nations, and in
three cases were given control of territory they had conquered, as
"mandatory powers." ·

